Introduction; what is game theory? what is behavioral game theory? games on networks; game theory and corruption.
This lecture focuses on mathematical descriptions of strategic situations in which payoffs to agents depend on the behavior of the other agents (applied to the analysis of conflict, cooperation, and corruption).
Instructor: Jorge Finke
Office hours: TBD
|1||Lec 1 - Introduction|
|2||Lec 2 - Human decision-making|
|3||Lec 3 - Bayesian rationality|
|4||Lec 4 - Representations of a game|
|5||Lec 5 - Existence of solutions|
|6||Lec 6 - The ultimatum game|
|7||Lec 7 - Epistemic games|
|8||Lec 8 - Battle of the sexes|
|9||Lec 9 - Rationalizable strategies|
|10||Lec 10 - Common knowledge|
|11||Lec 11 - Backward induction|
|12||Lec 12 - Extensive form rationalizability|
|13||Lec 13 - Extensive form CKM|
|14||Lec 14 - Models of corruption|
|15||Lec 15 - Unification of behavioral sciences|
Decision theory and human decision-making; beliefs, preferences, and constraints; consistent preference orderings; utility functions.
Bayesian rationality; Savage’s Axioms; expected utility principle (Savage’s Theorem); biases and heuristics; Prospect theory.
Representing a game; extensive form game; normal form game; solution concepts; strict dominance; iterated dominance; Nash equilibria.
Mixed strategies, Nash equilibria (formal definition), the fundamental theorem; paradigmatic games.
Game theory an human behavior; conditions for altruism; the ultimatum game; norms of cooperation; the public goods game; implications for policy-making.
Epistemic games; how to incorporate beliefs into games? An simple epistemic game.
Epistemic games; an epistemic battle of the sexes.
Strategy elimination in normal form games; rationalizable Strategies; best response sets.
Common knowledge of rationality; example: the beauty contest.
Backwards induction (extensive form game); subgame perfect Nash equilibria; perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria
Repeated games; Prisoner’s dilemma; extensive form CKR.
Modal logic of knowledge; formalize extensive form CKR; CKR → backward induction.
A model of reputation; honesty and corruption; social norms.
Common underlying model of human behavior? Evolutionary game theory; dynamical systems: equilibrium concepts; course review.